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1. The story of the Aleph
In his (1993), David Sanford describes a situation that he believes to be coherent, but inconsistent
with  “standard”  formal  mereologies.   In  Jorge  Luis  Borges'  story “The Aleph”1,  an object,  the
Aleph,  is  described that  is  inside Beatriz  Viterbo's  house,  and has in  turn,  inside it,  the whole
universe.  The Aleph is on Earth – is part of the Earth – but the Earth is also part of it. This is
inconsistent, Sanford says, with the principle of anti-symmetry: that if x is part of y, and y is part of
x, then x=y. 
I would like to refine Sanford's example a little. Sanford simply quotes Borges, and Borges' story
focuses on the fantastic nature of the Aleph. But the more we think of the Aleph as fantastic and
weird, and unlike any other object in the universe, the easier it is to think of the scenario as one in
which the Aleph “contains” the universe in some non-mereological sense; or in which the Aleph
only appears to have the Earth as a proper part. The best and most difficult version of a Sanford-
style counter-example would go like this: Suppose that, prior to the events of Borges' story, Beatriz
Viterbo discovered the Aleph for herself. Looking at her cellar staircase through a powerful electron
microscope, she finds a tiny apparent replica of the Earth among the microscopic constituents of the
19th step. Looking closer, she sees an even tinier apparent replica of herself in her house, looking
into a tiny electron microscope. Zooming out, she sees that the tiny Earth is surrounded by a Solar
System,  and  indeed  by  a  tiny  apparent  replica  of  the  entire  known  universe,  all  forming  a
microscopic part of the 19th step. Looking into the sky with a powerful radio telescope, she sees
that what she thought was the universe is in fact a part of a gigantic intergalactic replica of her
cellar, as seen from the 19th step. Being a parsimonious reasoner, she concludes that the apparent
replicas are one and the same thing – that the Earth she found in her staircase is the Earth she lives
on; that the gigantic step in the sky is the one in her house; and she is right (says the story).2
Let us call the tiny apparent replica of the known universe the Aleph. On this version of the story,
the Aleph is the known universe, and contains the Earth in just the sense that the known universe
contains the Earth; the Earth is a proper part of it. The Aleph is itself a proper part of the 19th step,
and is so in just the same sense that other microscopic constituents of the step are proper parts of it
too. By “proper part” here, I mean part in a sense that excludes both numerical identity and material
coincidence. The leg of a statue is a proper part of it, but the statue is not a proper part of itself, and
nor is the clay it is made of. Proper parthood of an object goes with being, as I put it above, “strictly
within” an object, and with occupying a proper subregion of the space that object occupies.3 It is
apparently true in the story that the Aleph is both a proper part of the Earth, and that the Earth is a
proper part of it.
The  principle  of  anti-symmetry  that  Sanford  mentions  is  in  fact  frequently  denied  in  formal
mereologies that wish to accommodate pairs of distinct objects that materially coincide, or “are
made of the same stuff” – a statue and the clay it is made of, persons and their bodies. So there is no
difficulty about devising a formal mereology that does that. But the Earth and the Aleph are not like
* Thanks to my colleagues Jean-David Lafrance and Martin Pickup, and to participants at the Nottingham philosophy
seminar, and Oxford TWiP seminar, for comments on and discussion of this paper.
1 Originally published in Spanish in 1949, but widely translated and republished, for example in (Borges 2000).
2 The alternative, less parsimonious, hypothesis open to Viterbo is that she is part of an unbounded infinite series of 
universes, nested inside each other like Russian dolls. Another reason, besides parsimony, to reject this hypothesis 
is that it is inconsistent with unrestricted merelogical composition. (Bohn 2009)
3 None of this is intended in any way as a definition of “proper part”, only as a gloss to help you get the idea.
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coincident but distinct objects: they occupy different places in the mereological heirarchy; the Earth
is strictly within the Aleph, and the Aleph strictly within the Earth; they are not “right on top of each
other” in the way that coincident entities are supposed to be. The story puts pressure not just on the
anti-symmetry of parthood, but on a more indubitable principle, the anti-symmetry of proper part:
that if  x is proper part of y, then y is not a proper part of x. Sanford is right to think that this is a
radical departure from the “official view” of mereology.
On my version of the story, the Aleph is just one member of a cycle of proper parthood that also
includes the Milky Way, the Solar System, the Earth, Viterbo's house, and so on. The Aleph, in my
version of the story, was the “tiny apparent replica” of the known universe found by Viterbo herself.
But what counts as the “known universe” depends on who does the knowing. If someone who only
knows of the Solar System discovered the Aleph, they would be amazed to find a tiny apparent
replica of the Solar System among the microscopic constituents of the 19th step. If an intelligent ant
that never left the cellar discovered the Aleph, it would be amazed to find a tiny apparent replica of
the cellar. If we take seriously the idea that everything there is a part of the 19th cellar step of
Viterbo's house, then there is nothing special about the aggregate of galaxies that we think of as the
“known universe” – no sense in which it and it alone is the “biggest thing there is”. Anything that
has the Aleph as a part can be consistently regarded as “the universe”.
A consequence of this is that there cannot be two Alephs; that is, it would not be coherent for the
story to continue “and Viterbo found another tiny replica of the universe in the 18th step, and had
just the same sort of evidence that it was the whole universe too”. When Viterbo looked into the sky
with the radio telescope and receives evidence that she is part of the Aleph, she saw an intergalactic
apparent replica of her cellar as if from the point of view of the 19th cellar step. That tells her that
the Aleph is on the 19th step and not (e.g.) the 18th. To find two Alephs in the same way, she would
have to see something inconsistent through the radio telescope.4
2. Sanford's challenge
What  should  mereologists  make of  the  story of  the  Aleph?  I  think  that  there  are  four  general
approaches that could be taken.
First, there is what is perhaps Sanford's own view – that all formal mereology rests on a mistake;
that there are no general conceptual truths of the mereological relation that can be stated purely in
the language of “part-whole” together with first-order logic.  If we are not to accept that conclusion,
then what can we say about the story? – I call this question “Sanford's challenge”.
Second, there is the dismissive reply to Sanford's conference given by van Inwagen – that the story
of the Aleph contains conceptual falsehoods, but gives the impression of coherence because “the
author of a fantasy has the power to in confer 'truth the story' on known conceptual falsehoods”
(van Inwagen 1993, 229). Other mereologists have been surprisingly quick to accept this view.5
Without wanting to get into the philosophy of literature, it's not obvious to me that van Inwagen is
right in his diagnosis. It does not seem possible for an author to make it true in a fiction that there
are married bachelors. (On the other hand, Borges was a literary genius, and if anyone could do this,
he could). 
More importantly, my reconstruction of the story presents a more powerful argument than Sanford
did, and one that cannot so easily be rebutted. I am not just asking you to consult your intuitions to
decide that a work of literature is internally consistent. The story also describes a way in which a
clearly  consistent  set  of  evidence  could  favour  a  scenario  in  which  there  is  a  mereological
4 Though, interestingly, what Borges describes seeing in the Aleph is inconsistent in the same way that Viterbo's radio
telescope readout would have to be – he sees the universe from every point of view at once. (Note that this is 
different from what Viterbo sees through the microscope in my version of the story).
5 See for example Casati and Varzi (1999, 35–36).
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circularity.6 But scenarios cannot be favoured by evidence unless they are consistent. In any case,
even if both these objections to the dismissive reply fail, it would be nice to explore other possible
replies to Sanford's argument.
Third, there is are deflationary replies that explain away the apparent cycle of proper part relations
in the story. For example, perhaps the right way to think of the Aleph is as a wormhole in space that
leads from Viterbo's house to a point on the edge of the known universe. Looking through the
Aleph, you see the known universe as if from a great distance; but the known universe is not part of
the Aleph. This way of thinking about what's going on fits Borges' original story better than the
dismissive reply above, I think.7 But it does not fit my version of the story very well. In my version
of the story, it would be arbitrary to single out the Aleph for this kind of explaining away. For the
reasons I described above, anything that has the Aleph as a part can be regarded as “the known
universe” and discovered to to have a tiny apparent replica of itself inside it. It's no less plausible
that the Aleph has the Earth as a part, than it is that the Solar System does.
Fourth, there are straight replies that attempt to concoct a formal mereology among the models of
which can be found something that seems to match the story of the Aleph (as well as something that
seems to match the actual world). It is to devising a straight reply that I now turn.
3. Straight replies: Cotnoir and Bacon
I want to discuss two straight replies to Sanford's challenge: the first is given by Cotnoir and Bacon
in their (2012); the second is original to this paper. Both Cotnoir and Bacon's and my approach can
be seen as starting from the idea that  the story of the Aleph is  a  counter-example to  the anti-
symmetry of proper part. There is, however, an immediate problem with this move that the two
replies deal with in very different ways.
The problem is this: the proper part relation is commonly supposed to be transitive as well as anti-
symmetric – if  x is a proper part of y and y is a proper part of z, then x is a proper part of z. If there
are counter-examples to anti-symmetry – cases of x and y such that x is a proper part of  y and y a
proper part of x – then it follows that x (and y for that matter) is a proper part of itself. This however
runs contrary to what I said earlier about the concept of “proper part”. Proper part, I said, means
“part in a sense that excludes... numerical identity”; by that I meant that it should be a conceptual
truth that nothing is a proper part of itself. To put this point more abstractly, the proper part relation
is commonly supposed to be a strict ordering: transitive, anti-symmetric, and irreflexive. We are
trying to relax the requirement of anti-symmetry while keeping as much as else as we can. But
every transitive irreflexive relation is,  perforce,  anti-symmetric;  so to deny that the proper part
relation is anti-symmetric, we must either deny that it is transitive or that it is irreflexive.
Cotnoir and Bacon make the latter move. On their view, proper part is transitive, but neither anti-
symmetric nor irreflexive. Their paper presents an ingenious generalisation of classical mereology
called  Non-wellfounded  Mereology (NWM) which  allows  for  this,  and which  they apply to  a
number of philosophical problems other than Sanford's challenge. I won't present the details of their
system here – the following objections to it depend only on what I've said about it so far. It seems to
me this  reply to  Sanford's  challenge  suffers  from three  problems,  which  I  discuss  in  order  of
increasing severity.
6 My argument here is analogous to Shoemaker (1969), which argues that since a consistent set of evidence could 
favour the existence of a global freeze – a period of time during which nothing changed –  the hypothesis that a 
global freeze occurred must be metaphysically possible (and afortiori consistent).
7 Actually, neither fit it that well. But then, some aspects of Borges' story don't really square that well with the idea 
that the Aleph even appears to have everything as a part. As mentioned above, when Borges (the character) looks 
into the Aleph he sees possible point of view. But that's not either like seeing the universe as if it were a part of the 
Aleph, nor like seeing the universe as if from a great distance.
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First problem: losing our grip on the concept of proper part. It's all very well to say that the proper
part relation is not necessarily irreflexive, but do we have a clear grasp of what that means? What is
the difference between those things that are proper parts of themselves and those that are not? Is
there any way of explaining what “proper part” means, in natural language terms, without assuming
(as  I  did  in  my explanation)  that  nothing  is  ever  a  proper  part  of  itself?  These  are  rhetorical
questions, but I'm not sure that I know their answers. At least more work needs to be done here.
The second and third problems are more serious.
Second  problem:  distinguishing  circularity  from  coincidence. Cotnoir  and  Bacon's  theory  is
intended to allow for two individuals to materially coincide (e.g. a statue and the clay it is made of).
They do this by saying that for two individuals to coincide is for those individuals to have at least
one  proper  part  and have all  and only the same proper  parts  (and indeed this  is  one standard
definition  of  coincidence).  However,  it  also  follows  on  their  theory  that  two  individuals  that
coincide are proper parts of each other. There is thus no mereological difference between a set of
things that are all part of a cycle of proper parthood (e.g. in the story of the Aleph: the known
universe, the Earth, and Beatriz Viterbo's house) and a set of things that materially coincide (e.g. the
statue, the lump of clay). In both cases, the things in the set are all mereologically indistinguishable
from  each  other.  But  intuitively  (insofar  as  one  can  have  intuitions  here)  the  mereological
relationship between the Earth and the Aleph is very different from the relationship between the
statue and the clay.
Third  problem:  the  “betweenness”  problem.  The  mereological  relation  has  a  “betweenness”
structure that, in the normal case, is implicitly represented in the part-whole relation. The Solar
System is “mereologically between” the Milky Way galaxy and the Earth – moving from whole to
part down the mereological heirarchy, you pass through the Solar System on the way between the
Milky Way and the Earth. If we can assume that the proper part relation is anti-symmetric, then
mereological betweenness can be analysed in terms of proper part: x is between y and z iff x is a
proper part of y and z is a proper part of x. (You may wish to check that this works for the Solar
system, the Milky Way and the Earth.) Insofar as I can make sense of the story, I imagine that these
betweenness facts obtain between some but not other triples of objects of which the Aleph is a part.
For example, Viterbo's house is between the Earth and the Aleph; and, because the Aleph is the
known universe, the Milky Way is between the Aleph and the Earth. But Viterbo's house is  not
between the Aleph and the Earth; and the Milky Way is not between the Earth and the Aleph. If you
move from whole to part, starting from the Aleph, you get to the Earth before you get to Viterbo's
house, and not vice versa. If you move from whole to part, starting from the Earth, you get to the
Aleph before the Milky Way, and not vice versa. These facts of mereological betweenness seem to
me to be essential to understanding the story. Without them I cannot imagine the Aleph being any
different  from the  Earth;  I  am forced  to  imagine  them coinciding.  So there  are  differences  of
mereological “betweenness” between the Earth and the Aleph and Viterbo's house, and the Milky
Way; but these differences are not represented by any facts about what is a proper part of what, on
the assumption that proper part is transitive, and the Earth and the Aleph are proper parts of each
other.
What should we make of these problems? I can see two likely morals. First, we should deny that the
proper part relation is transitive, or else pay more attention to a closely related relation that is not
transitive; that way we can continue to affirm that it is irreflexive (solving the first problem) and
hopefully solve the second and third problems as well. Second, we would do well to pay attention to
the ternary relation I have called “betweenness”, which has hitherto been neglected in treatments of
formal mereology.
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4. Straight replies: resolutionism
My reply is as follows. Notice  each of the things which have the Aleph as a part is equally a
candidate  to  be  regarded  as  “the  universe”.  We can  think  of  this  as  a  kind  of  metaphysical
indeterminacy – the world “has not decided” which of those things is the totality of all there is. A
good way of representing an indeterminate state of affairs is by representing all the determinate
states of affairs that that it is indeterminate between, and we can apply this technique to the case of
the Aleph.
Think about all the models of classical mereology that resemble the mereological structure of the
story of the Aleph, but in which different “candidates” really are the universe – the fusion of all that
exists – in each model. In one model, for example, the Aleph is the universe, and this thus not a part
of Viterbo's  cellar  stairs  (that model perhaps resembles the mereological structure of the actual
world). In another model, the Milky Way is the universe, and is thus not part of the Aleph (which is
part of Viterbo's cellar stairs). In yet another model, Viterbo's house is the universe, and the Aleph
(with  the  Milky Way as  a  part  of  it)  is  part  of  the  house.  None  of  these  models  of  classical
mereology individually represents the mereological structure presented in the story, but collectively
they do. I will call each of these models a resolution – each resolution resolves any mereological
circularity by representing some member of each mereological cycle as maximal within its cycle
(i.e. having all other members of its cycle as proper parts).
So the  mereological  structure  of  the  story of  the  Aleph consists  in  a  set  of  resolutions  –  one
resolution for each individual that has the Aleph as a part, and with each such individual having all
other individuals as parts  in some resolution. The mereological structure of the actual world – or
any other world that does not have any mereological cycles in it – an acyclical world, for short –
consists in a set of resolutions with exactly one member.
When we say that x is a proper part of y (without reference to any resolution) we may take that to
mean x is proper part of y in some resolution. (And similarly, x is part of y can be taken to mean x
is part of y in some resolution). Since each resolution is a model of classical mereology, and since
an acyclical world has exactly one resolution, then if the world is acyclical, then the proper part
relation satisfies the axioms of classical mereology (in particular, it is irreflexive, transitive, and
anti-symmetric).
Now consider what we can say about proper part in the story of the Aleph (and thus in general). The
proper  part  relation  must  still  be  irreflexive:  because  every  resolution  is  a  model  of  classical
mereology, on no resolution is anything a proper part of itself. However, the proper part relation is
not  antisymmetric,  since  there  can  be  some x and y such that  x  is  a  proper  part  of  y  on one
resolution, and y a proper part of x on another. In particular, there will be some resolution in which
everything is a part of the Earth (and in particular, in which the Aleph is a proper part of the Earth)
and another resolution on which everything is part of the Aleph (and, in particular, in which the
Earth is a proper part of the Aleph). So the Earth and the Aleph are mutual proper parts – which is a
straightforward way of saying that the Earth and the Aleph are involved in a mereological cycle of
the kind described in the story. Finally, the proper part relation is not transitive: if x is a proper part
of y on one resolution, and y a proper part of z on another, there is no guarantee that x is a proper
part of z on either or any resolution. In partcular, though the Aleph is a proper part of the Earth on
some resolution, and the Earth a proper part of the Aleph on another, it does not follow that there is
any resolution on which the Aleph is a proper part of itself (indeed, for the reasons given above,
there cannot be any such resolution).
Now consider the betweenness problem. We can adequately define “betweenness” in the following
way: y is mereologically “between” x and z iff there is some resolution r such that y is a proper part
of x in r, and z is a proper part of y in r. This avoids the betweenness problem, because, in the story
of the Aleph, we may suppose, there is no single resolution in which the Milky Way is a proper part
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of the Earth and the Aleph a proper part of the Milky Way. So the Milky Way is not “between” the
Earth and the Aleph. On the other hand, there is a resolution on which the Milky Way is a proper
part of the Aleph and the Earth a proper part of the Milky Way; and another resolution on which the
Earth is a proper part of the Milky Way, and the Aleph a proper part of the Earth – so, the Milky
Way is “between” the Aleph and the Earth, and the Earth is “between” the Milky Way and the
Aleph.
5. Conclusion
Back to the big picture: now that we've seen a straight reply to Sanford's challenge, does it seem
good enough? Should we say that the coherence of the story of the Aleph teaches us that the part-
whole relation is strictly speaking, not transitive? Or should we take the modus tollens, and say that
the ugliness of the best straight reply available is reason to deny that the story is coherent?
I find it hard to decide; but I am not disturbed by this. The purpose of formal mereology (as I
understand it – and I think that this purpose is implicit in Sanford's critique of formal mereology as
well) is to separate certain of the conceptual truths concerning the mereological relations (namely
those that can be formalised in a purely mereological language) from the substantive truths. This
project is of utility to philosophers because it enables philosophers who disagree about substantive
matters to at least agree about what the consequences of each others theories are. It would be nice if
we could  devise a  universal  mereology whose theorems would all  be universally agreed to  be
conceptual  truths.  Unfortunately, that  is  impossible  –  not  because  there  are  no such truths  but
because  of  the  requirement  for  universal  agreement.  Philosophers  may disagree  about  what  is
conceptually true, just as they disagree about what is substantively so. We may also find ourselves
uncertain about what is conceptually true. In fact, what's fun and philosophically rich about the
story of  the  Aleph and many of  Borges'  other  works  is  precisely that  they create  that  kind  of
uncertainty.
So, I remain undecided on whether the story of the Aleph is coherent. But at least, I am convinced,
it poses no threat to the project of doing formal mereology in general.
 
Appendix: a formal treatment
In this section I present a first-order theory that matches the informal discussion in the text. It will
be helpful to begin by sketching an axiomatisation of classical mereology in order to make the
relationship between the theory I describe, and classical mereology clearer.
The primitive of our axiomatisation of classical mereology shall be < “is part of”, and there shall be
the following defined predicates and operators:
x y ≡ x<y  ¬y<x≪ ∧ “x is a proper part of y”
x y ≡ ( z)(z<x  z<y)∘ ∃ ∧ “x overlaps y”
(Fu y)(φ[y]) x ≡ ( z)(x z ↔ ( y)(φ[y]  y z))∀ ∘ ∃ ∧ ∘ “x is a fusion of the φs”
The axioms of classical mereology shall be as follows:
(Refl) x<x
(Asym) x<y  y<x → x=y∧
(Trans) x<y  y<z → x<z∧
(SSP) ¬x<y → ( z)(z<x  ¬y z)∃ ∧ ∘
(GSP) ( x)(φ[x]) → ( y)((Fu x)(φ[x])y)∃ ∃
SSP here stands for “strong supplementation principle” and GSP for “general sum principle”. The
significance of these principles is outside the scope of this paper; for a discussion see (Simons 1987,
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25–37) or (Casati and Varzi 1999, 38–47). Note that the definition of the operator Fu and the axiom
GSP slightly  stretch  the  usual  syntax  of  first-order  logic:  the  expression  “(Fu  y)(φ[y])”  is  to
understood as a complex predicate (with y standing in for an otherwise unbound variable, and φ[y]
being  an  open  sentence  containing  a  free  occurrence  of  y).  This  is  normal  in  first-order
presentations of classical mereology: see the citation to Simons above.
Though I've made < (“part”) primitive, and  (“proper part”) defined (this is formally cleaner, as ≪ ≪
does not play any role in the axioms) it would be equally possible to make  primitive and <≪
defined, as indeed Simons does; that might better fit the text of this paper, in which most attention is
paid to the concept of “proper part”.
Above, I said that the mereological structure of the world consists in a non-empty set of resolutions,
where each resolution is a model of classical mereology. I will now show how to represent that
structure using a first-order theory. The primitive of this theory shall be the ternary relation of “- is
part of -  in the resolution -”. We write this as follows: “x<ry” is to be read “x is part of y in r”. The
theory will therefore be a form of ternary mereology; compare for example (Thomson 1983).
It will be handy to speak of individuals overlapping in a resolution, or some individual being a
fusions of some individuals in a resolution, so let us define those in a parallel way to the way we did
above:
x≪ry ≡ x<ry  ¬y<∧ rx “x is a proper part of y in r”
x∘ry ≡ ( z)(z<∃ rx  z<∧ ry) “x overlaps y in r”
(Fur y)(φ[y]) x ≡ ( z)(x∀ ∘rz ↔ ( y)(φ[y]  y∃ ∧ ∘rz)) “x is a fusion of the φs in r”
The ternary relation of “betweenness” discussed in the text can also be defined. Since we are now
considering a ternary mereology, this becomes a 4-ary relation:
 y is between x and z in the resolution r ≡ x≪ry  y∧ ≪rz
It will also be useful to have the monadic predicate “is a resolution”, which I will write R. Since
each thing is part of itself (in every resolution), and there cannot be an empty domain in first-order
logic, it's reasonable to define R as follows: r is a resolution iff there is some x such that x is part of
x in r:
Rr ≡ ( x)(x<∃ rx) “r is a resolution”
Each resolution is to be a model of classical mereology; that is for each resolution r, the binary
relation  <r should  satisfy  the  axioms  of  classical  mereology given  above;  that  is,  each  of  the
following should be theorems of our ternary mereology. Let us posit them as axioms:
(Refl) Rr → x<rx
(Asym) Rr → (x<ry  y<∧ rx → x=y)
(Trans) Rr → (x<ry  y<∧ rz → x<rz)
(SSP) Rr → (¬x<ry → ( z)(z<∃ rx  ¬y∧ ∘rz))
(GSP) Rr → (( x)(φ[x]) → ( y)((Fu∃ ∃ r x)(φ[x])y))
What exactly is a resolution? Since, for our intended application of this theory, each resolution
represents a different individual as the universe, we can identify resolutions with the individuals
that are the fusion of everything in that resolution. Since the axioms above do not guarantee this,
let's have an additional axiom that does:
(U) Rr → (Fur x)(x=x)r
Axiom U is not really necessary in order to obtain desirable consequences; but without it there are
ways in which models of the theory may differ which do not correspond to any difference that is
significant  in the philosophical interpretation of those models.  Take,  for example,  a model that
represents the mereological structure of the story of the Aleph, on which U is satisfied. There are a
very large number of models resulting from permuting the extension of the ternary relation in that
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model with regard to the resolution argument only (e.g. one on which the Earth plays the role of the
resolution in which the Aleph is the universe, and vice versa). These models really do differ as
regards what is part of what in what resolution, but do not differ in any way that matters. It would
be best if only one permutation of that kind were allowed, and U is one way to do that.
Also, we need to guarantee that there is at least one resolution (“the mereological structure of the
world consists in a non-empty set of resolutions”):
(N) ( x)(Rx)∃
We can  now  define  binary part  and  proper  part  in  terms  of  their  ternary namesakes,  and
“betweenness” in terms of ternary parthood in the way suggested in the text:
x<y ≡ ( r)(x<∃ ry)
x y ≡ ( r)(x≪ ∃ ≪ry)
y is between x and z ≡ ( r)(y is between x and z in r) ≡ ( r)(x∃ ∃ ≪ry  y∧ ≪rz)
Binary part and proper part are reflexive and irreflexive respectively, neither are anti-symmetric or
transitive. The need for N is seen in ensuring that binary part is reflexive.
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